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Abstract 
Since the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC (2001), Madrid (2004) and London 
(2005), the European Union (EU) has stepped up its efforts to develop new instruments and 
reinforce existing ones to fight terrorism jointly. One of the key aspects of the EU-wide fight against 
terrorism and serious crime is the facilitation and enforcement of information and intelligence 
exchange among law enforcement authorities and, to a limited extent, security and intelligence 
services. This article examines how far the EU’s commitment to democracy, accountability and 
transparency is actually fulfilled with respect to its efforts at fighting terrorism by drawing on the 
example of the activities of the European Police Office (Europol). Taking the European Parliament 
(EP) and National Parliaments (NPs), but also inter-parliamentary forums, into account, the article 
analyses how, and to what extent, mechanisms of democratic accountability and, in particular, 
parliamentary scrutiny are in place to hold EU-wide counter-terrorism actors, such as Europol, to 
account. This is a particularly timely question given that Europol’s parliamentary scrutiny 
procedures are currently subject to considerable changes due to the change in its legal mandate as 
of 1 January 2010 and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Keywords 
Europol; Counter-terrorism; EU internal security; Parliamentary scrutiny; Democratic accountability; 
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IN ITS RECENTLY ADOPTED INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY (ISS), THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(EU) re-emphasised its strong commitment to fighting terrorism within its territory 
(Council of the European Union 2010a). Indeed, counter-terrorism practices are not a 
purely domestic task anymore. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, DC on 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist incidents on European 
territory, “police institutions across the globe have proliferated their counterterrorism 
strategies, both domestically and abroad, while international police have likewise stepped 
up their campaigns” (Deflem 2006a: 241). As a regional actor, the EU quickly identified 
terrorism as one of the key common threats its member states have to face in the current 
world (Council of the European Union 2003, 2010a).1 The transnational nature of the threat 
and the realisation that “Europe is both a target and a base for […] terrorism” (Council of 
the European Union 2003: 3) are continuously referred to as justifications for increasing 
counter-terrorism activities at the EU level (for example, Europol 2008: 5). Key features of 
                                                
1 This article refers to terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism (see Council of the European Union 2002a). 
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the EU’s fight against terrorism are, for example, anti-radicalisation measures, instruments 
to combat the financing of terrorism, as well as the strengthening and facilitation of 
information and intelligence sharing between not only police authorities, but also other 
security providers, such as intelligence services (Spence 2007; Howorth 2008).2 
While the EU swiftly pushed its counter-terrorism agenda and provided for institutional 
and mandatory changes, concerns have been raised by parliamentary actors, human rights 
bodies and a few academic scholars that this development has not been sufficiently 
accompanied by thorough democratic monitoring and scrutiny of the activities. This 
article will investigate this claim, focusing on the efforts of the European Police Office 
(Europol) at fighting terrorism. Europol is well suited for this purpose as it is the only EU-
wide law enforcement body and it has experienced both an extension of its remits over 
the years, as well as an increase in financial and personnel resources (see Europol’s Annual 
Reports; House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2007: para. 88). Originally set up as 
an intergovernmental body outside the EU framework, Europol became an EU agency on 1 
January 2010. The article will examine how far the EU’s continuous emphasis on its 
commitment to democracy, accountability and transparency in its security policies is 
actually fulfilled with respect to Europol and EU-wide counter-terrorism policing.3 In the 
context of transnational policing, the EU remains an understudied actor. This article will 
shed some light on how, and to what extent, mechanisms of democratic accountability 
and, in particular, parliamentary scrutiny are in place to hold EU-wide counter-terrorism 
actors, such as Europol, to account. This is a particularly timely question given the recent 
institutional and quasi-constitutional challenges the EU experienced under the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The article proceeds as follows. The first section will outline the extent to which the EU, 
and, in particular, Europol are now involved in activities aimed at fighting terrorism. Based 
on this exploration, the second section will briefly discuss the need for mechanisms of 
democratic accountability, and parliamentary scrutiny in particular, with respect to EU-
wide counter-terrorism policing. To explore the challenges of democratic scrutiny in 
depth, sections three and four will analyse current forms and tools of parliamentary 
scrutiny available to the European Parliament (EP) and National Parliaments (NPs) 
respectively with a particular focus on counter-terrorism policing at the EU level. 
Completing the picture of the parliamentary scrutiny mosaic, the final section will explore 
recent debates concerning strengthened inter-parliamentary co-operation in this field. 
Europol and EU counter-terrorism policing 
In July 2001, the EP’s Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home 
Affairs (2001) regretted in a Report the EU’s “slowness in responding to the terrorist threat 
and the fact that there is as yet no coherent and legally binding set of coordinated 
measures”. Two months later, the events of 9/11 had a considerable impact not only on 
national policing strategies and powers in many EU Member States, but also on the EU. 
Immediately afterwards, the then Presidency of the European Council (2001) stated that 
the fight against terrorism ought to become a major policy objective of the Union. The 
2010 ISS emphasised that terrorism remains the main common threat to the EU (Council of 
the European Union 2010a). 
                                                
2  In this article, the term ‘intelligence services’ refers to both domestic security services and foreign intelligence 
services, unless stated otherwise. 
3 Recent references to such values can be found in official documents, such as the Lisbon Treaty, the ISS and 
the Stockholm Programme (European Council 2010). 
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The EU’s agenda on counter-terrorism has been rightly described as event-driven (see, for 
example, Coolsaet 2010). The9/11 attacks provoked the EU to prioritise the fight against 
terrorism as a policy objective. It led, for example, to an EU-wide agreement on a common 
definition on the term ‘terrorism’ and the proliferation of initiatives and institutional 
changes as well as the expansion of functions and mandates of institutions in the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). To tackle terrorism, the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
called for a broad response to terrorism suggesting “a mixture of intelligence, police, 
judicial, military and other means” (Council of the European Union 2003: 7). Yet, it was only 
after the Madrid bombings that the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts really “began to come 
together” (Howorth 2008: 96). The bombings were followed by a Declaration on 
Combating Terrorism of 15 March 2004, providing for a long-term EU strategy to combat 
terrorism with a particular focus on the root causes of terrorism. Notably, the Declaration 
also provided for the expansion of Europol’s competences and the establishment of the 
Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), an intelligence unit which is now part of the European 
External Action Service. The 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy finally became the main 
point of reference for the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts, identifying four key areas in which 
the EU was to become more proactive: ‘Prevent’ (radicalisation and recruitment), ‘Protect’ 
(people and infrastructure from terrorist attacks), ‘Pursue’ (terrorists) and ‘Respond’ (to a 
terrorist attack) (Council of the European Union 2005a).  
Given that the EU prioritises a law enforcement approach to terrorism, most of its efforts 
are located in the field of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters (PJCC).4 
Certainly, “large chunks of counterterrorism endeavours in Europe remain principally 
within the confines of national decision-making” (Coolsaet 2010: 858). That refers, in 
particular, to sensitive operational matters. There is nevertheless an increasing pressure on 
security providers to adopt an approach of ‘need to share’, rather than maintain the 
traditional approach of ‘need to know’. This has become visible in the form of national 
fusion centres, such as the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, where operational 
intelligence concerning terrorism is collected, analysed and distributed. Yet the ‘need to 
share’ does not only refer to the domestic framework, but also to the international realm 
(Gill and Phythian 2006; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Concerning counter-terrorism, 
logistical, financial and administrative efforts have been made to facilitate such 
international collaboration.  
The EU broadly focuses on the enhancement of communication between counter-terrorist 
actors at various policy levels. In the operational fields of policing and intelligence, the 
term communication mainly refers to information and intelligence sharing. For example, 
the so-called Swedish Framework Decision of 2006 called on national law enforcement 
authorities to improve their information sharing; and the aim of a 2005 Council Decision 
was to strengthen the exchange of information concerning terrorist offences (Council of 
the European Union 2005b, 2006). Collecting and analysing information about suspicious 
individuals and behaviour is widely understood to be of utmost relevance for detecting 
terrorist suspects and intervening before the actual criminal offence. Disrupting terrorist 
networks often depends on “low-level, factual and fragmented” (Gibson 2009: 923) 
information, including foreign phone numbers, travel records or credit card transactions.  
The EU-wide institutional provisions in this field vary immensely. For example, the 2008 
Council Decisions concerning the stepping up of cross-border co-operation with a 
particular focus on counter-terrorism and cross-border crime, based on an international 
treaty between the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands and Spain 
(‘Treaty of Prüm’), allow for the sharing of data among national law enforcement 
                                                
4 In addition, the EU implemented preventive administrative measures to fight terrorism proactively. Key 
examples are the establishment of terrorist watch lists, the exchange of Passenger Name Records (PNR) with 
countries such as the United States (US) as well as the EU’s efforts to freeze terrorist assets. 
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authorities including fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples and vehicle 
registrations (Council of the European Union 2008a, 2008b). Other forms of bi- as well as 
multilateral co-operation are more informal and partly take place outside the EU 
framework (see Den Boer et al. 2008).The most formal example for strengthened co-
operation in the field of law enforcement, and counter-terrorism as well, is Europol, the 
central European-wide law enforcement body based in The Hague.  
 
Europol aims to facilitate the exchange of information and criminal intelligence in the field 
of law enforcement. The body is bestunderstood as a formal network due to its elaborated 
liaison system including Europol Liaison Officers (ELOs) seconded from national authorities 
of the EU Member States but also from non-EU countries and international organisations, 
such as Interpol.5 Europol’s central secretariat is located in The Hague and was staffed with 
662 people in 2009, including ELOs and personnel directly employed by Europol (Council 
of the European Union 2010b). In addition to police officers, staff of other law enforcement 
authorities, customs and intelligence services work at Europol’s premises. Europol’s 
budget has been increased from €68.5 million for 2009 to €92.6 million for 2010 – which 
included €12.5 million to allow for a smooth transition to become an EU agency (Council 
of the European Union 2010b). 
According to its mandate, Europol’s overall objective is“to support and strengthen action 
by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in 
preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime 
affecting two or more Member States” (Council of the European Union 2009a: Art. 3).6 To 
fulfil its mandate, Europol focuses on investigative and analytical intelligence, collects and 
analyses data from national police agencies and other security authorities and transfers 
information and intelligence to designated national authorities or EU bodies if necessary. 
According to its Annual Report covering 2008, Europol (2009) annually supports around 
“15,000 international investigations into the most significant criminal networks in the EU”. 
As a network of information exchange, it has only limited capacities to gather information 
on its own and needs to be provided with data from national agencies (Monar 2006: 503). 
It nevertheless has its own analysis capabilities – most obviously in form of the criminal 
intelligence databases titled Analysis Work Files (AWFs), two of which – ‘Hydra’ and 
‘Dolphin’ - are designated for counter-terrorism. The results of such strategic analyses on 
different types of crime, including terrorism, are then circulated to EU bodies and national 
police forces. This also includes the possibility to assist national criminal investigations by 
the means of information analysis. 
Europol’s Counter Terrorism Unit, which used to be part of its Serious Crime Department, 
is now part of Europol’s recently established Operations Department (O4). The Unit 
comprises the areas ofterrorism, illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, 
illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives as well as racism and xenophobia 
(Council of the European Union 2005c). Operational and strategic analysis, support to 
operational investigations at the national level and training of police officials are the main 
tasks of the Unit. More specifically, it provides a range of analytical products (terrorism 
threat assessments, ‘missing links for ongoing international investigations’); it facilitates 
information exchange and access to Europol’s databases and exchange systems; it can 
provide expertise ‘on-the-spot’ through its mobile office and hosts and it maintains several 
analysis initiatives (Council of the European Union 2010b: point 3.1). The 2009 data for 
                                                
5 Laurence O’Toole (1997: 445) refers to networks as “structures of interdependence involving multiple 
organisations. They exhibit some structural stability and include, but extend beyond, formal linkages alone”. 
See also Gerspacher and Dupont (2007) and Deflem (2006b). 
6 The mandate was expressed in a similar manner in Europol’s previous mandate, the so-called ‘Europol 
Convention’. 
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Europol’s secure network suggests that 7 per cent of the new cases were related to 
terrorism (Council of the European Union 2010b: point 2.4). In recent years, it has 
increasingly developed “more strategic instruments, such as the European Bomb Database 
and the Early Warning System for explosives and CBRN material” (Council of the European 
Union 2010a: 8). 
Due to the limits that Member States imposed on Europol, it does not have executive 
police powers.7 In the last couple of years, however, various steps have been made 
towards a more active and operational role of Europol, which led to a discussion about 
Europol’s potential move towards a European Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI; see 
Occhipinti 2003; Jeffrey-Jones 2007). Smaller countries such as Austria and Belgium have 
indeed suggested the establishment of an FBI-like European Police Office, but this was not 
followed up on (European Report 2005). Nevertheless, there are indications that Europol is 
slowly transforming into a more operational body and there has been an expansion of its 
powers. For example, Europol staff can participate in so-called joint investigation teams 
(JITs) alongside national authorities and it can request individual states to initiate or 
conduct investigations in specific cases (Council of the European Union 2002b).To 
improve the EU-wide fight against terrorism, Europol also gained access to other 
databases of the EU, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Visa 
Information System (VIS) database (Council of the European Union 2005d, 2008c).  
There is also an external dimension of Europol’s co-operative network. Europol can 
establish and maintain relations with bodies from third countries. The negotiations with 
the United States (US) after the 9/11 attacks were the most extensive between Europol and 
a third country so far. They concluded in an agreement in December 2001 on the 
exchange of both strategic and technical information in the fight against a broad range of 
serious forms of international crime and the exchange of liaison officers followed by an 
additional agreement on exchange of data on persons in December 2002 (Europol 2001, 
2002). This co-operation was further intensified through a formal liaison arrangement with 
US law-enforcement agencies.8 More recently, as part of the EU-US Terrorism Finance 
Tracking Programme (TFTP) Europol has become the EU agency responsible for verifying 
the legality of requests from American counterparts concerning financial data from the 
SWIFT banking network. 
Europol’s secure communication channels are also used for other multilateral counter-
terrorism activities. One example for this is the Atlas group, a grouping of special anti-
terrorism teams from all 27 EU member states, including the British Special Air Service 
(SAS) and the French Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN). While 
there is little information publicly available about the group, its key aim is to foster co-
operation of national counter-terrorist forces, also in order for those forces to be able to 
support each other in the context of a terrorist incident (European Commission 2007: 9). 
The forces are meant to strengthen their co-operation “where necessary through 
organisational and operational arrangements, between Police, Customs, Security Services 
and Special Forces in the Crisis Management of terrorist incidents” (European Commission 
2007: 9). 
To conclude, this section has demonstrated the emergence of counter-terrorism policies 
of the EU over the last decade. Europol continuously strives for a strengthened role in 
counter-terrorism activities, despite its remaining lack of operational and arrest powers. As 
Europol’s Director recently emphasised in a media interview, that Europol ensured an 
                                                
7 Article 72 of the TFEU maintains that the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security lies with the Member States. 
8 The Europol-US agreements are examples of the growing external dimension of the AFSJ. In this dimension, 
the fight against terrorism is also one of the priority areas (see European Commission 2005). 
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important role in the transatlantic TFTP ought to be understood as yet another indicator 
that it moves further into “frontline counterterrorist work” (Fidler 2011).  
Means of counter-terrorism potentially touch on civil rights and individual freedoms, 
however. It is therefore a highly political decision to fight terrorism by certain means and 
not by others, if at all. According to standards of democratic security governance, debates 
and negotiations about this should not be left to executive, technocratic bodies meeting 
‘behind closed doors’, but such decisions require transparent debates and scrutiny 
procedures in public forums, such as parliaments (see also Elvins 2006: 36). The following 
section will therefore explore in how far Europol’s counter-terrorism activities have been 
accompanied by mechanisms of democratic accountability and, in particular, 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
A vacuum of democratic accountability? 
To ensure democratic accountability, parliaments are often understood as the most 
important accountability holders in democratic regimes (e.g. Bovens 2007). Parliamentary 
scrutiny ensures the accountability “to a body the majority of whose members are 
democratically elected and capable of determining the broad direction of policy” (Morgan 
and Newburn 1997: 80). In general, parliaments are mandated to check the executive and 
debate and pass laws and therewith “confer democratic legitimacy upon the binding rules 
that govern the demos” (Tsakatika 2007: 549). They can hold governmental actors to 
account and provide overall guidance for them. By holding policing bodies to account, 
parliaments also provide voters with information that allows them to judge the 
performance of the institution in question. Finally, parliaments also provide the forum to 
discuss, and decide, what kinds of conduct a society wishes “to declare off-limits” (Peirce 
2009). 
A lack of sound democratic scrutiny concerning counter-terrorism actors and their 
performance would appear to be particularly severe, as the activities are of a very sensitive 
issue and debates about them are intermingled with questions of human rights and 
individual freedoms. That networks under the EU’s umbrella focus on information 
exchange and data analysis rather than executive functions does not mean that such 
freedoms and rights cannot be hurt by their work. False or misinterpreted information can 
impinge on an individual directly. For example, the individuals listed on the EU’s so-called 
terrorist list are directly affected by this administrative act of ‘listing’ as their financial assets 
are frozen and they are subject to travel restrictions (Guild 2008). Moreover, information 
distributed via networks, such as Europol, have been gathered somewhere and their 
origin, and the means by which they have been gathered, are not always transparent to 
other network participants. To put it in a nutshell, counter-terrorism might affect human 
rights and individual freedoms and it is therefore supposed to be governed by strict rules 
and norms of democratic control.  
The experiences of terrorism in various European countries in the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s encouraged co-operation at the European level under the umbrella 
of the TREVI group in 1975.9 The creation of TREVI was the starting point for increasing co-
operation with regard to policing, judicial cooperation and mutual assistance in civil and 
criminal law, formally framed in Title VI (‘Police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters’) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which became effective on 1 November 
1993. Since then, the area has been characterised by a “restless institutional dynamic” 
(Walker 2004: 14), further pushed by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 calling for the 
creation of the AFSJ. The area grew in impressively short time both in terms of functions 
                                                
9 TREVI refers to ‘Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violence Internationale’. 
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and in terms of institutional capacity, comprising diverse policy aspects and institutions. 
As a consequence, the AFSJ is understood as being complex, ambiguous and opaque 
(Guild and Carrera 2005: 2). 
Article 67of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) maintains an 
explicit mandate for the EU to provide a high level of security for its citizenry. The tools of 
providing security through information-sharing networks such as Europol raise concerns, 
however, about the relationship between the citizens – for whom security is provided – 
and the networks as the security providers. It appears that the bonding between the 
citizens and the practices of transnational counter-terrorism policing is a fragile and barely 
existing one. The Third Pillar was of an intergovernmental nature, i.e. the decision-making 
processes remained in the hands of member-states’ governments. While the Lisbon Treaty 
merged the acquis of the Third Pillar with that of the Community and therefore provides 
for ordinary supranational EU decision-making procedures with respect to most matters of 
JHA, operational police co-operation is one of the issues that remain subject to the 
unanimity in the Council and where the EP has only to be consulted (General Secretariat of 
the Council of the EU 2009). In addition, the Treaty allows for enhanced co-operation with 
respect to police work. Due to the strong role of the executive in this policy field, citizens 
have only limited and rarely direct impact on the field. This is intensified by the general 
problem that transnational policing has only “low public visibility” (Loader 2002).It is 
therefore likely that accountability and transparency in this field remain problematic under 
the Lisbon Treaty. Certainly, this is in sharp contrast to the original idea of the creation of 
the AFSJ which “was to be based upon the principles of transparency and democratic 
control, as well as upon an open dialogue with civil society in order to strengthen the 
acceptance and support of citizens” (Eder and Trenz 2003: 113; European Council 1999). 
Moreover, the Third Pillar has been well-known for its technocratic policy-making 
approach “whereby decisions are de-politicised through being placed in the hands of law 
enforcement ‘experts’ to develop ideas and legitimising discourse for political elites. Such 
bodies do not have to justify either the basis of those decisions, or their implications, to 
national democratic structures” (Elvins 2006: 36-37). With respect to Europol, this approach 
became in particular obvious in the debate about the Europol-USA agreements on the 
exchange of data and liaison officers. 
The following two sections will explore the parliamentary scrutiny of Europol, and the EU’s 
counter-terrorism activities more broadly, focusing on the EP (section 3) as well as the role 
of NPs (section 4). The sections will analyse the struggle for sound parliamentary scrutiny 
of Europol over time, taking into account the recent changes caused by the transfer of 
Europol from a body based on an international treaty to an EU agency. While Europol 
remains politically accountable to the Council, and Europol’s Director is accountable to 
Europol’s Management Board comprising one representative from each Member State, 
and the Commission, the arrangements of parliamentary scrutiny are far more complex.  
Scrutinising Europol at the EU level: the role of the European Parliament 
Given Europol’s mandate and range of activities, scrutiny through the EP appears to be a 
crucial feature of its oversight system. Yet, the EP’s powers were strictly limited with 
respect to policing before the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty. Overall, “European 
internal security cooperation [was] characterised by the disinclination of the Union’s 
interior ministers and their officials to subject themselves to robust parliamentary input” 
(McGinley and Parkes 2007: 245). The TEU excluded the EP, but also its national 
counterparts, from any serious role concerning matters of policing. Although the Treaty of 
Amsterdam provided the EP with a few more competencies concerning the Third Pillar, 
the Council continued to hold most of the power in this area. The case of Europol was no 
exception (Occhipinti 2003: 68; Anderson 1995: 254). Moreover, the EP had merely 
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consultative powers with respect to the implementation process of the EU’s emerging 
counter-terrorism policy (Monar 2005: 450). It was also completely excluded from the two 
agreements between the EU and the US on extradition and mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters on 25 June 2003 (Monar 2004: 406). The governments of the EU Member 
States kept their sovereignty in this area as much as possible.  
Despite the fact that the lack of parliamentary scrutiny had long been criticised by civil 
rights activists, parliamentarians and others, the national governments - in form of the 
Council of Ministers –were deeply reluctant to allow a stronger role for parliaments in this 
area. The key reason was their desire to keep full control over this area. Consequently, the 
Council, but also the European Commission, used to involve the EP only when absolutely 
necessary. Article 39 of the TEU required the Council to consult the EP before the adoption 
of any legally binding measures in this field (e.g. decisions, framework decisions and 
conventions). That included, for example, decisions regarding the development of 
Europol, but it excluded any priority setting. Moreover, such a consultation procedure had 
no binding effects for the Council “whereas parliaments in the Member States must 
approve rules governing the functioning of national agencies” (Apap 2006: 3). Even when 
it came to the adoption of the Council Act of November 2002 regarding the crucial 
Protocol to amend the Europol Convention and the Protocol on the privileges and 
immunities of Europol, the members of its organisations, the deputy directors and the 
employees, a lack of consultation was stated by MEPs. All in all, at least three key 
challenges to parliaments can be identified in the specific context of Europol’s work: there 
is a lack of regular reports on police cooperation between national authorities, the reports 
provided by Europol contain insufficient information to assess effectiveness and 
appropriateness of its activities and there is no independent assessment of Europol’s 
operations (Peers 2005: 202).  
Given these serious limitations of parliamentary scrutiny with respect to Europol, several 
academic scholars, policy-makers and police practitioners suggested improvements 
concerning the democratic control of Europol in general and its parliamentary oversight in 
particular (see, for example, Bruggeman 2006; House of Lords 2003; Apap 2006; Puntscher 
Riekmann 2008). Some of these have been included into the Lisbon Treaty which, overall, 
strengthens Europol’s parliamentary scrutiny. However, that the national governments 
were keen on keeping the EP excluded from decision-making with respect to Europol for 
as long as possible became apparent briefly before the Lisbon Treaty took effect. The 
Treaty would abolish the EU’s pillar system and, constituting one single legal framework, 
provide for co-decisive and consent powers for the EP.10 According to Article 68 TFEU, the 
European Council could set “strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning”, 
but the EP was nevertheless to be involved in the legislation process. Therefore, at a time 
when the Treaty of Lisbon was agreed on but not yet ratified fully, the governments of the 
Member States ratified and implemented some important protocols which were necessary 
in order to agree on a Decision replacing the Europol Convention. If they would not have 
found an agreement and the Treaty of Lisbon would have entered into force quickly, such 
a regulation would have had to be negotiated with the EP (see also Monar 2008: 121). 
A similar situation emerged in late 2009. On 25 November 2009, the EP rejected four 
proposals concerning Europol which had been tabled by the Council with regard to 
Europol’s AWFs, the confidentiality of its information, its exchange of personal data with 
partners and its agreements with third countries. Again, the timing is crucial to understand 
the Council’s attempts to avoid parliamentary involvement in matters of policing. By the 
time the Council presented the proposals to the EP, the provisions of the TEU required the 
                                                
10 There are severe limitations to the EP’s role given special provisions on several issues concerning police and 
judicial co-operation. In particular, operational co-operation among national law enforcement authorities is an 
area in which the EP will continue to have a consultative role only. 
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Council only to take the opinion of the EP into account (which in practice meant that it 
could ignore it). Had the proposals been tabled only one week later, the Lisbon Treaty 
would have been entered into force and the EP would have had the powers of full co-
decision making on these issues. The EP criticised the Council’s rush of the decisions 
sharply (European Parliament 2009). Nevertheless, the JHA Council ignored this criticism 
and adopted the four proposals during a meeting on 30 November – one day before the 
Lisbon Treaty became effective (Council of the European Union 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 
2009e). 
Yet the EP has not been entirely ‘toothless’ in the field of PJCC. For example, the EP 
increased its influence in these matters over time through so-called issue linkages. Since 
the Parliament’s approbation was necessary for First Pillar legislation, it sometimes agreed 
on a legal instrument only under the condition that its opinion would be considered 
seriously with respect to a certain Third Pillar measures. Such was the case concerning the 
debate about the VIS, for example (McGinley and Parkes 2007: 248).  
Also, the investigation into the European involvement in the CIA’s extraordinary rendition 
programme must be understood as a counter-terrorism feature where the EP acted as a 
substitute at a time when NPs were not sufficiently safeguarding their role as 
accountability holders (Hillebrand 2009). Following an investigation by the Council of 
Europe into the involvement of European countries in cases of extraordinary rendition, the 
EP used its powers to set up aTemporary Committee on the alleged use of European 
countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners (TDIP) (European 
Parliament, TDIP 2007; see also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006, 2007). The 
collection of information appeared to be a challenging task, partly because some EU 
bodies were reluctant to assist the work of the TDIP Committee. As a consequence, the 
final report bluntly criticised the lack of co-operation of individual EU officials and 
institutions in the investigation, including the refusal of the then Director of Europol, Max-
Peter Ratzel, to appear before the Committee.  
Given the limited role of the EP in the intergovernmental decision-making processes 
within the Third Pillar and with respect to Europol in particular, it pushed initiatives to 
change Europol’s legal basis for some time. Most notably, in a 2003 Resolution on 
Europol’s Future Developments it suggested to replace the existing Europol Convention 
with a Council decision so that decisions relating to Europol would no longer be taken by 
the Council acting unanimously but would need to be adopted by qualified majority and 
by co-decision with the EP (European Parliament 2003). The EP also required to be 
“provided with the legal means and institutional framework to enable it in the future to 
exercise genuine democratic control” (Apap 2006: 4). 
The transfer from an intergovernmental institution to an EU agency also meant that 
Europol would lose autonomy and that its (semi-)operational powers could be easier 
expanded at the same time. This led the 2006 Finnish EU-Presidency to table the 
improvement of Europol’s legal framework, and the JHA Council on 4-5 December 2006 
agreed to replace the Europol Convention by a Council Decision. The Commission quickly 
provided a draft decision, but a consensus on the final wording of the Council decision 
establishing Europol was only reached some 15 months later at a Meeting of the JHA 
Council on 18 April 2008 (see Amici 2010: 82-83). The final Decision was adopted on 6 April 
2009 and has been effective as of 1 January 2010 (Council 2009a). 
This 2009 Council Decision includes substantial changes concerning Europol’s mandate 
and its powers. Up to the end of the year 2009, Europol operated outside the EU Treaty, 
but the Council Decision transferred Europol into an entity of the EU. That implies that 
European Community action rules now apply to Europol. Crucially, the EP is now involved 
in controlling and overseeing Europol’s budget (Art. 43(6), (9) and (10) Council Decision). 
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This change had an impact on the EP’s powers to gather more information directly from 
Europol, as “Europol is also obliged to submit to the EP, at the latter’s request, any 
information required for the smooth application of the discharge procedure for the 
financial year in question” (European Commission 2010: 7).  
The new Council Decision also maintains that the adaption of the Council Decision 
strengthens the role of the EP with respect to Europol’s scrutiny, as the Parliament has the 
general right to be heard in respect to all implementing measures based on a Council 
decision. More explicitly, Article 88 of the TFEU maintains that the EP will now “determine 
Europol’s structure, field of action and tasks” in co-decision with the Council. 
So far, however, practices appear not to have changed substantially. Over time, the EP as a 
whole and in particular members of its LIBE Committee have pointed out again and again 
the marginalisation of the EP with respect to EU security matters. For example, in the 
context of developing and implementing the ISS a recent working document of the LIBE 
Committee criticised the “disregard shown to date by the Commission and Council for the 
role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in drawing up this strategy. […] 
Incredible as it may appear, the principal strategic documents adopted to date by the 
European Council, the Council and the Commission seem to ignore the existence of the 
European Parliament altogether” (European Parliament, LIBE Committee 2011: 4). Crucially, 
the Commission was criticised for effectively delaying the ‘Lisbonisation’ of Europol, 
despite the EP’s clearly signalised priority of this matter (European Parliament, LIBE 
Committee 2011). 
While the EP remains struggling to ensure a stronger position within Europol’s oversight 
system, the Commission, in contrast, continuously emphasised that “the opportunities for 
scrutiny of Europol by the European Parliament are ‘legally appropriate’” and that it 
“would not support deeper involvement by, for example, including provision in a future 
Regulation for the European Parliament to designate members of Europol’s Management 
Board or to participate in the appointment of Europol’s Director” (European Commission 
2010b: point 10.11). The Commission justified that decision with the limited powers and 
autonomy of Europol. National executives tend to support the Commission’s stance. For 
example, the UK Minister of Crime Prevention argued that “in order to protect Europol's 
political independence, there should be no role for the European Parliament on Europol's 
Management Board or in appointing Europol's Director” (House of Commons, EU 
Committee 2011). 
While it appears that the recent changes of Europol’s legal footing and institutional role 
within the EU have brought about several improvements concerning the EP’s scrutiny 
powers with respect to Europol and, overall, strengthened the parliamentary scrutiny at EU 
level, the following section will draw the attention to parliamentary scrutiny procedures at 
the national level. 
Scrutinising Europol at the national level: the role of national parliaments 
The network perspective on Europol, suggested at the beginning of this article, refers to 
strong linkages between Europol’s central secretariat and national law enforcement 
authorities in the Member States – most notably through Europol’s liaison system. This 
structure calls for a crucial involvement of all NPs in Europol’s parliamentary scrutiny 
landscape. From a perspective of democratic governance, scrutiny through NPs is 
important as it directly links the elected parliaments with the EU system (Guild and Carrera 
2005: 4). In Europe, police and intelligence authorities and their activities are overseen and 
controlled within the domestic framework. Since they are bodies with executive functions, 
the scrutiny of the governments through their national parliaments is a key mechanism. 
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Parliamentary scrutiny is also one element of the traditional checks on executive law 
enforcement powers in terrorism investigations. Finally, some authors argue that the main 
problems with regard to the EU’s overall democratic legitimacy remain at the national 
level and should therefore be tackled at that level as well (e.g. Muller-Wille 2006). 
Detailed comparative information about the ways in which NPs scrutinise matters of EU-
wide police co-operation is hard to find. A rare exception is the questionnaire that the 
Secretariat of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) circulated in 2008 among NPs to inquire into 
their scrutiny procedures of the Schengen process (i.e. the measures included in the 
Schengen Agreement, as well as the enlargement of the Schengen Area) (COSAC 2008: 
Annex). The questionnaire was driven by the question as to whether the particular 
sensitivity of the issues, which were touching on questions of asylum, security and 
individual freedoms, had pushed the NPs to reinforce their general scrutiny procedures of 
EU policies in this particular area (COSAC 2008: ch. 4 and Annex). The result was that most 
NPs continued to use their normal scrutiny procedures, which are usually not binding for 
the government in question. Several parliaments have strengthened their monitoring 
efforts concerning matters related to the AFSJ. In the German Bundestag, for example, “the 
scrutiny of EU-documents relating to the Schengen area is firstly scrutinised by the Internal 
Affairs Committee, then the European Affairs Committee and finally in the plenary. The 
Federal government has to report before and after the meetings of the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council to the Internal Affairs Committee on the different aspects of the Schengen 
acquis and on the enlargement of the Schengen area”(COSAC 2008: 39). Few countries 
have substituted their normal scrutiny procedures by special arrangements for Schengen 
issues (for example, Italy created a bicameral committee on Schengen and Europol).  
Despite such provisions, the role of NPs in the field of European police co-operation is 
criticised from various sides. One problem is that decision-making at EU level tends to 
exclude NPs in the early stage of policy-shaping and decision-making.11 Concerning 
procedures of parliamentary scrutiny, Monar (2008: 120) argued that there is a “problem of 
ineffective national parliamentary scrutiny procedures that have difficulties to cope with 
the increasing volume of JHA legislation”. That leads to delays in ratifying regulations 
which have been agreed at EU level. Another problem was raised by an MEP in an 
anonymous interview with the author in March 2008. Asked about the co-operation 
between the EP and NPs concerning the AFSJ, they criticised that the NPs are very much 
focused on national matters and would not feel responsible for the scrutiny of the EU’s 
(then) Third Pillar (Interview A). An expert in the field of data protection in the Third Pillar 
also expressed their impression that NPs have no time, do not take the time, have no 
interest or do not prioritise the area of police co-operation (Interview B). Given such 
limitations and restrictions, the general role of the NPs concerning police co-operation has 
been described as a ‘non-role’ (Lodge, 2007). Other observers have, however, argued that, 
in contrast to the EP, NPs often “had better opportunities to influence the legislation 
processes in the third pillar, due to the unanimity requirement” (Lummer 2008). 
Concerning Europol, NPs used to be involved in the ratification process concerning the 
proposals to amend the Europol Convention and the Protocols thereto. Such a national 
ratification process could push the involvement of NPs to explore Europol’s work (Peers 
2005: 203). Moreover, NPs have the powers to oversee their national representatives on 
Europol’s Management Board. These representatives do not report directly to their 
Parliament, however, but to their respective Government Minister and, as the collective 
board, to the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The national ministers are then answerable 
to their parliaments. 
                                                
11 For the problem of ‘de-parliamentarisation’ in general see Börzel (2000). 
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Up to the entry into force of the Europol Council Decision, the role of NPs concerning 
issues related to Europol was not clearly regulated. Art. 34 §3 of the Europol Convention 
only pointed to the fact that the Member States’ governments should deal with the 
parliamentary role individually. As a consequence, NPs were usually not involved in any of 
the agreements that Europol negotiated with third parties (such as the two Europol-USA 
agreements discussed above). Their involvement was limited to the ratification process of 
proposals for amending the Europol Convention and the Protocols thereto. In this process, 
they did not have an impact on the text, but only decide whether or not they want to ratify 
the amendment. For example, when the Europol Convention – Europol’s previous legal 
base - was originally established, neither the EP nor the NPs were consulted in the 
negotiations or the process of the drafting of the Convention. When questioned about the 
involvement of parliament in drafting and approving the Convention in the British House 
of Commons on 11 January 1996, the then British Home Secretary, Michael Howard, 
replied in writing as follows: “The final text of the Europol convention was published, and 
laid before Parliament, on 8 December last year. Drafts of the convention were not public 
documents and therefore were not published nor made generally available” (House of 
Commons 1996). Tellingly, he added that “[t]he police service were closely consulted 
throughout the negotiation of the convention through police representative 
organisations” (House of Commons 1996). Thus, while parliaments and the wider public 
were not involved in the negotiations at all, executive authorities were much more so. 
Moreover, the ratification process of the Europol Convention provided the NPs with no 
power to amend the text. This is a crucial basic problem with respect to Europol since, as 
Aden (2001: 112) stated, “[o]nce established, international bureaucratic institutions such as 
Europol will leave little scope to be reshaped by democratic institutions”. 
In 2002, the Dutch Parliament circulated a questionnaire among the parliaments of the 
then EU Member-States to understand how other NPs dealt with the subject of Europol 
(Fijnaut 2002). Though few countries replied, it became clear that at that point “Europol 
[was] usually only discussed in meetings – plenary sessions or meetings of special 
committees – concerning the European Union or the Third Pillar in general” (Fijnaut 2002: 
18). Also, it appeared that parliamentary chambers found it difficult to assess Europol’s 
work. However, several NPs across Europe had mechanisms in place to examine Europol’s 
budget and the protocols, which amend the Convention (see COSAC 2005: 89-94). 
Up to today, NPs primarily examine Europol’s performance “through their control over 
their respective governments, in accordance with the constitutional rules of each Member 
State” (European Commission 2010: 8). Crucially, NPs supervise the work of the minister 
responsible for policing, and therefore also Europol.  However, the recent transfer of the 
Europol Convention by a secondary EU law act in 2009 carries the danger that NPs might 
no longer be directly involved in future changes to Europol’s legal framework. Future 
amendments to the Europol Council Decision only require a qualified majority voting in 
the Council. This appears to be a considerable loss of powers for NPs as the ratification 
process of changes to Europol’s statutory footing was one of the few ways through which 
NPs were involved in Europol’s scrutiny (Lavranos 2003: 261). This way NPs were able to 
“influence decisions at EU level by pressuring their governments to veto a certain law” 
(Lummer 2008). The involvement of parliaments should not be limited to the approval of a 
convention anyway, however. Instead, they should already be engaged during the 
preparation process so they could have an impact on the content of agreements. In a 
similar vein, a report on Europol by the House of Lords (2003) pledged for a strong role of 
the NPs in the accountability procedure of Europol. 
Paradoxically, certain aspects of the TFEU suggest a potentially strengthened role for NPs. 
In general, NPs are called on to “contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” 
(Art. 12 TFEU). More specifically, the Treaty explicitly calls for NPs to engage with issues 
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concerning the AFSJ (for example, by ensuring that EU legislation in this area respects the 
principle of subsidiarity). With respect to Europol, NPs are to be involved in the “political 
monitoring” (Art. 12(c) TFEU) of its activities. However, the wording of the TFEU in this 
respect is vague and it remains to be seen which mechanisms NPs will use to fulfil their 
new mandate. Moreover, under the Lisbon Treaty, NPs receive from the Commission any 
draft legislative act at the same time as it is transmitted to the EP and the Council. They are 
asked to verify the latter’s compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and, depending on 
the national constitutional procedures, have the right to state an opinion (Art. 12 TEU; 
European Commission 2010: 20-21). 
What remains a particular concern are intergovernmental arrangements concerning 
counter-terrorism policing outside the EU framework. Guild and Geyer (2006) argued, for 
example, that NPs “are not able to guarantee democratic control over purely 
intergovernmental agreements.” A crucial example was the ratification procedure of the 
Prüm Treaty in the German Bundestag in May 2006. The government did not give the 
Bundestag a fair chance to influence the outcome as it granted only “some weeks for 
parliamentary scrutiny – including committee work” (Guild and Geyer 2006).12 Similarly, 
the external dimension of Europol’s network raises concerns. The two Europol-US 
Agreements of 2001 and 2002 - referred to earlier in this article - became directly binding 
law, but they did not involve the EP or NPs in any meaningful sense. Consequently, the UK 
House of Lords Select Committee (2003: 17) criticised the second EU-US Agreement for 
having “in effect been settled with the United States authorities before it was deposited 
for scrutiny.”  
To complete the picture, the final 
section will briefly explore the main discussion points.  
Towards a combined effort? 
a network perspective, given the interwoven structure of Europol’s 
various ‘nodes’.  
presentatives of the EP and the NPs (possibly drawn 
from existing specialist committees).  
                                                
As the scrutiny performance of the EP and, in particular, the NPs remains unsatisfactory on 
many accounts, some called for the parliaments to pool their powers and resources or to, 
at least, co-ordinate their work in this context better. 
The remaining shortcomings of parliamentary scrutiny led several observers to call for 
increased co-operation between NPs and the EP in order to ensure a high degree of 
scrutiny of Europol. A close co-operation between NPs and the EP has also to be 
welcomed from 
While there have been early attempts to establish a joint committee previously (e.g. 
European Commission 2002), such an option is dramatically facilitated by regulations 
under the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, Article 88(2) TFEU calls for co-ordination between 
the EP and NPs in scrutinising Europol. In principle, three institutional arrangements are on 
the table. Firstly, a strengthened role for an existing inter-parliamentary body, namely 
COSAC, which already has some experience with respect to matters related to the AFSJ. 
Secondly, a more informal option would be the use of existing inter-parliamentary 
meetings of MEPs as well as national MPs. And finally, a third option would be to create a 
new Joint Committee comprising of re
Interestingly, the Commission has taken a strong stance in favour of the third option. In 
late 2010, the Commission circulated a Communication on the procedures for the 
parliamentary scrutiny of Europol’s activities (European Commission 2010b). In it, the 
12 See also the criticism of the lack of time and influence concerning the first Europol-US Agreement on the 
transmission of personal data in the 2003 House of Lords Report on Europol. 
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Commission expressed dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements and called for the 
creation of a joint body or inter-parliamentary forum, comprising the relevant members of 
NPs and the EP, which would meet on a regular basis. Doing so would ensure “unifying 
parliamentary control at European Union level (without prejudice to national 
parliamentary procedures)” (European Commission 2010b: 15). It would also enable a 
smoother information transfer on Europol to NPs. 
mittee comprising 
representatives of 27 member states would be likely to be unworkable. 
romotion of effective and regular 
interparliamentary cooperation within the Union.” 
ework of the existing interparliamentary structures” (Federal Parliament of 
Belgium 2011).  
to a 
new legal framework for Europol (expected to be based on an EU Regulation) in 2013. 
A few NPs have quickly raised concerns about the proposal. The Commission 
Communication was discussed by the EU Select Committee of the House of Commons in 
February 2011, for example. It came to the conclusion that the suggested joint Committee 
would operate on a European, rather than the national level, and “would cover aspects of 
Europol's strategic planning and activities” which the House of Commons’ Committee 
“would not routinely consider” (House of Commons, EU Committee 2011). It also 
emphasised that “any views expressed within the framework of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation should not bind national parliaments or prejudge their positions” (House of 
Commons, EU Committee 2011). Moreover, the UK Minister for Crime Prevention, James 
Brokenshire rejected the idea, not seeing any additional value of such a body (House of 
Commons, EU Committee 2011). He pointed to the 2008 report by the House of Lords 
European Union Committee which maintained that such a joint Com
The Commission’s course of action in this matter hit a sensitive spot for parliamentary 
actors, threatening their self-understanding of independent authorities. As the House of 
Commons EU Committee (2011) explicitly stated, “it is for the European Parliament and 
national parliaments to determine together how to organise and promote effective and 
regular inter-parliamentary cooperation.” This is in accordance with Art. 9 of the Protocol 
(No 1) to the new Treaties on the role of NPs, which maintains that the EP and NPs “shall 
together determine the organisation and p
The idea of a joint committee, or strengthened inter-parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms, 
crucially depends on the willingness of the parliamentarians in question to engage with 
each other. As the discussion by the EU Committee above suggests, NPs might fear a 
power drain from the national to the EU level. As a consequence, NPs appear to slowly 
wake up to the need of becoming more actively involved in the discussion. At a recent 
meeting of the speakers of the NPs, the representatives also discussed the ‘Role of the 
Parliaments in the Monitoring of the European Freedom, Security and Justice’. For 
example, they discussed plans for the creation of a database which would allow 
parliamentary committees to exchange information concerning parliamentary oversight 
of the security and intelligence services (Federal Parliament of Belgium 2011). The creation 
of a ‘European Network of National Intelligence Reviewers’ by setting up a website was 
supported by the participants. More specifically, the speakers discussed the existing 
parliamentary mechanisms to monitor Europol’s activities in the light of the Commission’s 
communication. They considered the current forms of scrutiny to be insufficient and 
suggested “that scrutiny should be exerted by an interparliamentary body within which 
representatives of the national parliaments and the European Parliament would meet on a 
regular basis” (Federal Parliament of Belgium 2011). While details of form, mandate and 
structure of such co-operation remained unclear, it was suggested to organise the scrutiny 
“within the fram
While strengthened co-operation concerning the parliamentary scrutiny of Europol will 
remain the subject of discussions for some time, the Commission provided a clear 
timeframe, as it aims to integrate detailed mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny in
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Conclusion 
In most European countries, counter-terrorism activities are now regulated by special 
legislations which provide both police and intelligence authorities with special powers 
and means. At the same time, current counter-terrorism activities include procedures of 
information gathering and sharing across borders. The EU is an emerging actor in the field 
of counter-terrorism policing, though its powers are still very limited in comparison to 
national authorities. Yet, transnational threats, and the networked response by security 
providers, “put into question the foundations of a security system based on the norms of 
national sovereignty and a state monopoly of the legitimate use of violence” (Krahmann 
2005: 204). This development also causes challenges with respect to the democratic 
scrutiny of current transnational forms of security provision. This article was concerned 
with policing efforts via EU-wide networks in the field of counter-terrorism, which are 
tasked with the facilitation and enhancement of information and intelligence sharing, 
focusing on the case of Europol. 
The analysis of the responsibilities and powers of parliaments scrutinising Europol 
provided above provides a complex picture of the existing accountability and oversight 
landscape. At the time of writing this article, Europol’s legal framework and scrutiny 
procedures are still “the subject of an ongoing reflection” (European Commission 2010b: 
5). The article demonstrated that the scrutiny mechanisms have been changed several 
times since the creation of Europol, but the recent changes under the Lisbon Treaty as well 
as due to Europol’s new legal framework are the most dramatic ones. The analysis 
demonstrated that the EP has come a long way from a consultative body to a co-legislator 
in this field. The Parliament’s scrutiny powers have been strengthened, overall. The picture 
is more blurred when it comes to the role of the NPs, in particular due to changes in 
Europol’s ratification procedures. Neither the EP nor the NPs have been able to make full 
use of their new powers and rights so far, however, and currently seem to be in the 
process of ‘soul-searching’ in this respect. In general, it will remain difficult for 
parliamentary scrutiny bodies in this field to “show their muscle as the voice and guardian 
of the people” (Lodge 2004: 254). Any engagement in the field of police co-operation is 
hampered by various factors. In particular, the network-like transnational structure, the 
multitude of actors involved and the overall secrecy of the field pose crucial challenges.  
An important improvement would be an improved co-operation among parliamentary 
actors at both the EU and the national level. While the final section of the article outlined 
the challenges of creating any inter-parliamentary forum, such a body would allow 
parliamentary actors to compare their ‘best practices’ and problems in this field and to 
pool their investigative efforts with respect to EU-wide policing, and Europol in particular. 
At a time when internal security has become a fully-fledged policy matter under the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU has confirmed its commitment to values such as democracy, 
transparency and accountability. However, as ongoing debates about the new ISS suggest, 
there remains a mismatch of those normative claims and the EU’s everyday practices 
(House of Lords, European Union Committee 2011). Taking on an active role in negotiating 
their scrutiny rights and procedures, the NPs could make a constructive contribution to a 
strengthened democratic accountability of the EU in this field. 
*** 
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